, and Author: Haroro J. Ingram Islamic State (IS) has used English-language magazines as a crucial component of its propaganda strategy, particularly targeting Muslims living in the West. This paper provides a quick reference guide to IS's English-language magazines released between June 2014 and September 2017 examining key themes and propaganda strategies deployed across three issues of Islamic State News, four issues of Islamic State Report, fifteen issues of Dabiq and thirteen issues of Rumiyah. It concludes by highlighting four trends and their implications for CT-CVE strategic communications practitioners. First, IS use a mix of rational-and identity-choice appeals to provide its various target audiences with a 'competitive system of meaning' which CT-CVE strategic communication efforts must seek to dismantle with careful campaign and message design. Second, over the period of 2014-17 IS appears to have deployed a thematic 'hedging' strategy characterised by certain messaging themes being prioritised over others during periods of boom versus bust. By identifying the signatures of IS's use of propaganda 'hedging', CT-CVE practitioners can be better prepared to confront current and future challenges from IS propagandists. Third, IS's English-language magazines must be understood within the context of trends across its broader propaganda effort. To effectively address this multifaceted threat, CT-CVE practitioners would benefit from applying the KISMI (Keep It Simple Maximise Impact) principle of rolling-out a strategic communications campaign. Finally, the appearance of instructional material in IS propaganda highlights the need for post-incident CT-CVE strategic communication plans to undermine the strategic logic of so-called "inspired" attacks.
Introduction

"The media is a jihad in the way of Allah. You, with your media work, are therefore a mujahid in the way of Allah (provided your intention is sound). The media jihad against the enemy is no less important than the material fight against it." Excerpt from Media operative, you are also a mujahid, Al-Himma Library
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it offers a quick reference guide to Englishlanguage magazines released by Islamic State (IS) between June 2014 and September 2017: Islamic State News (issues 1-3), Islamic State Report (issues 1-4), Dabiq (issues [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] and Rumiyah (issues [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . This collection of primary source materials spans a historical period characterised by extraordinary booms and busts for IS that offers valuable insights into the strategic logic of its propaganda, especially how it both opportunistically and strategically sought to appeal to English-speaking audiences. Rather than in-depth content analyses, this paper is designed to provide scholars and practitioners with a reference guide for shaping their own engagement with the materials. Second, this paper draws out four key trends to emerge from this analysis and explores its implications for CT-CVE strategic communications practitioners. To these ends, this paper begins by outlining the overarching strategic logic of IS propaganda as a means to frame the quick reference guide that follows. It concludes with a suite of operational, strategic and policy recommendations applicable for government, private and civil society sector CT-CVE practitioners.
The strategic logic of Islamic State propaganda
The field is inundated with analyses of IS's propaganda efforts and even a casual glance at this literature reveals the diversity of themes in IS messaging and the range of mediums the group uses to disseminate its messages to local and transnational audiences. 1 It is important, however, to step-back and consider the strategic logic of IS propaganda, i.e. the overarching purpose of its messaging effort within the context of its broader politico-military campaign strategy.
What emerges from this perspective 2 is that the fundamentals of IS's propaganda efforts are far from unique. Indeed the basic principles of its propaganda strategy broadly reflect the thinking of modern insurgency thinkers from Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara to Ho Chi Minh and Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.
3 IS share with their counterparts an understanding of asymmetric warfare as dual battles of control -characterised by clashing politicomilitary systems (i.e. what Bernard Fall would call "systems of control") -and battles of meaning (i.e. the deployment of messaging designed to shape the way friends, foes and neutrals perceive the conflict). The great strategists of modern asymmetric warfare understand that in order to compete against adversaries who typically enjoy considerable technological and resource advantages, it is necessary to synchronise politico-military and propaganda efforts to maximise the effects of their actions and narrative as well as nullify those of opponents. Like the great strategic plagiarists that they are, IS's propaganda strategy broadly mirrors these common principles.
4 Figure 1 offers a graphic representation of the strategic logic that drives IS's propaganda efforts. At its core, the raison d'être of IS's messaging is to shape the perceptions and polarise the support of target audiences. It achieves this by deploying messages that are designed to contribute to two broad lines of effort. First, IS messaging draws on pragmatic factors -such as stability, security and livelihood -as a means to promote its politico-military actions and denigrate those of its enemies. This type of messaging is geared towards leveraging rational-choice decision-making in its target audiences by presenting, inevitably jaundiced, cost-benefit consideration of options. Rational-choice messaging was particularly prominent in IS's propaganda through 2014-15 when, unsurprisingly, it had politico-military successes in the field to promote itself as the alternative to its competitors. As its so-called caliphate crumbled and traveling to IScontrolled territories became increasingly difficult, IS introduced terrorist instructional material into its propaganda messaging in 2016 as a pragmatic alternative to becoming a foreign fighter for its supporters. Radicalisation (2017) . http://icsr.info/2017/02/icsr-report-media-jihadislamic-states-doctrine-information-warfare/ Second, IS messaging also plays on perceptual factors tied to identity, solution and crisis constructs (see Figure 1 ). This type of messaging is designed to coax its audiences into engaging in identity-choice decision-making, i.e. decisions based on what is deemed appropriate for their identity. These types of appeals are central to the core narrative at the heart of IS's propaganda: we are champions and protectors of Sunni Muslims (the ingroup identity) and the only hope for solving enemy (i.e. anyone who is not ISIS aligned Sunni Muslims) induced crises. IS's identity-choice appeals compel its supporters to perceive themselves and the world through identities that simultaneously present ISaligned Sunnis as pure and divinely guided while anyone outside of this narrow category is dehumanised, filthy and worthy of destruction. Take for example the following excerpt from "You will remember what I have told you" published in Rumiyah's fourth issue: The defense of Darul-Islam and the Shari'ah is not a responsibility solely for the mujahidin. Thus, no slave has any excuse with Allah nor with the Muslims if the brothers of apes and swine and worshippers of stones, trees, and men reach it. Rush, therefore, to join the caravan of jihad and support the fighters for Allah's cause in any way you can help, with combat, wealth, incitement, and supplication.
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Synchronising their deployment of rational-and identity-choice messaging becomes an important means for IS to try and align powerful decision-making processes in its audiences. Overall, IS's propaganda is calibrated to provide its audiences with a "competitive system of meaning", i.e. a lens through which to perceive and judge the world. The deeper followers can be drawn into accepting IS's system of meaning the more likely it is that their judgements will be shaped by that view of the world and the greater their vulnerabilities to supporting the group. Understanding the fundamental dynamics of IS's propaganda campaign also offers valuable insights into its strategic adaptability to pivot as its politico-military fortunes ebb and flow. It is this overarching strategic logic that has driven IS's varied propaganda efforts including, of course, messaging in its English-language magazines.
It is also important to consider what is unique about IS's approach to propaganda and three key factors are worth highlighting here. First, the apocalypse hangs like a pall over IS's entire messaging effort emerging as a flexible and ever-ready mechanism to amplify perceptions of crises and the urgency of its agenda amongst supporters whether in times of boom or bust. Second, IS draws on the notion of a caliphate as a multidimensional mechanism to appeal to its supporters rational and identity-choice decision-making. In IS propaganda the caliphate emerges as simultaneously the inevitable product of purely applying its methodology (manhaj) and thus a politico-military ideal as well as a jurisprudential imperative and eschatological precursor. Of course, IS are not unique in leveraging the apocalypse or caliphate in their messaging but it is the degree to which it is not only drawn upon in their messaging but operationalised via decisions in the field that sets it apart from many of its peers. This also helps to underscore the third and arguably most important factor: the various components of IS's propaganda effort are intimately connected to generate a self-reinforcing and compounding strategic and psychological impact on target audiences. 6 The result is a campaign that demonstrates a multidimensional, comprehensive, coherent and systematic approach to propaganda. This results in an overall messaging effort that fundamentally differentiates IS from its competitors. Put another way, there is no single factor that renders IS's propaganda campaign as radically innovate from its peers. Rather, it is the cumulative impact of a Soviet-Afghan War (1979 -1989 , the Afghan Jehad Quarterly was published in English, amongst other languages, in an effort to draw attention to and support for the Afghan and foreign mujahideen war effort. The Australia-based Nida'ul Islam was arguably the flagship militant Islamist English-language magazine of the 1990s featuring interviews with the likes of the Afghan Taliban and, in 1996, a then little known Osama Bin Laden. When Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched Inspire magazine in mid-2010, the influence of its American editors -Samir Khan, the editor of several issues of Jihad Recollections published in 2009, and the charismatic Anwar Al-Awlakiwas clear. Inspire's "Open Source Jihad" section -offering readers detailed operational advice -immediately became its most notorious feature with Issue 1 featuring an article titled "Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom". 7 There have been others, of course, including the Taliban in Khurasan's Azan, As-Sahab media's Resurgence and the Mujahideen of Shaam's Al-Risalah. This context is highlighted because it offers a broader historical and strategic context for the narrow focus of this paper.
The following analysis covers an historical period beginning in June 2014 with the publication of issue 1 of Islamic State News and ending with issue 13 of Rumiyah released in September 2017. It covers a period of over three years stretching from the weeks immediately preceding IS's triumphant capture of Mosul to a point of utter ruin in its heartlands of Iraq and Syria. The period epitomises the boom-bust dynamic that characterises much of IS's history and analysing the propaganda of this particular period -even if limited to a single format (online magazines) and language (English) -offers important insights into the group's propaganda campaign and message design strategies. The quick reference guide that follows is divided into sections, each of which begins with a brief analysis of the narrative, thematic and propaganda strategy trends across the respective magazine's issues followed by a table containing a short summary of each issue's major themes and key articles.
Islamic State News (Issues 1-3)
All three issues of Islamic State News (ISN) featured photo reports with captions that tended to be dominated by rational-choice appeals promoting IS's politico-military efficacy but also the deficiencies or cruelty of its enemies. While ISN's issues were short publications of no more than ten pages, its authors highlighted a range of topics from ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 The AQ Chef. "Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom", Inspire ( issue 1 politico-military aims. 13 The central theme of these articles was the tangible benefits IS was delivering to its citizens across a range of governance initiatives. Put simply, IS were not just filling a politico-military void but advancing the lot of their citizens. ISR's content included interviews with, for example, the organizer of an imam training workshop, the "Head of the Consumer Complaints Division" and the head of police. Such a strategy is designed to personalize, humanize and give credibility to IS's governance efforts. Crucially, these reports also directly and unambiguously framed all of these initiatives as crucial to having a functioning state -for example, ISR's report on policing highlights "their importance in state building" 14 -that is also in accordance with the correct manhaj (methodology). ISR's contents reflect an interweaving of rational-and identity-choice appeals that would become the signature of Dabiq magazine. ISR's third issue stands out from the others in that it was devoted solely to one topic: IS's capture of Mosul. While issue 3 contained all the expected celebratory themes and imagery, it also offered ISR's authors with an opportunity to promote IS's strategic prowess in insurgency warfare: This past Monday, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham liberated the city of Mosul in its entirety. Campaign 'Enter upon them through the gate' succeeded in placing the city under the full control of the Islamic State….
This followed a shift in the Islamic State strategy, which now saw its forces leaving their desert strongholds in Iraq and making their way into the cities. Since the start of the jihad in 2003, the province of Al-Anbar has traditionally been the stronghold of the mujahidin, with Fallujah serving as its jihadi capital. In spite of the advantage of having a strong power base, the Islamic State understood that having just a single power base in any given region would work against them by giving their enemies a point of focus for their strikes.
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In its final issue, ISR heralded the destruction of the Sykes-Picot border implying that their achievement represented the fulfilment of the Prophet Muhammad's prophecy ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… that "[t]here will be oppressive kingship for as long as Allah wills, then He will remove it when He will. Then there will be khilafah on the prophetic methodology." 16 [organisation] . It will also contain photo reports, current events, and informative articles on matters related to the Islamic State." 17 The logic behind the magazine's name was also articulated: "As for the name of the magazine, then it is taken from the area of Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. This place was mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq." 18 The magazine's format and structure remained broadly similar from its first issue released in July 2014 to its fifteenth issue released in July 2016. Each opened with the same quote attributed to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi: "The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify -by Allah's permission -until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq." With each issue, the reader is reminded of the fusion of the profane and sacred realms in IS's war and the imminence of the apocalypse. Indeed, the apocalypse unambiguously hangs over every issue of Dabiq from the opening Al-Zarqawi quote to the final page which typically featured an excerpt from the hadiths to highlight certain signs leading to End Times in an effort to draw historical parallels to the present.
Across fifteen issues, Dabiq's authors drew upon an extraordinary range of themes in articles that often appeared in recurring sections that were central to every issue. For instance, a "Feature" article, typically promoted on the cover page, brought into acute focus the central theme of that particular issue (see Table 3 ). "Islamic State Reports" and "Islamic State News" sections remained broadly similar in style and format to Dabiq's predecessor magazines -with photo reports and short articles respectively -that made up a significant portion of Dabiq's early issues. However, by issue 7, Dabiq's contents were becoming increasingly dominated by lengthier, more in-depth articles. Indeed, in Dabiq's later issues, the type of reporting that had appeared in relatively large "Islamic State Reports" and "Islamic State News" sections now appeared in a much shorter "Islamic State Operations" section; arguably partly a result of IS's waning fortunes in the field warranting a smaller allocation of space. Other sections such as "In the Words of the Enemy" -where IS would offer counter-narratives to the views of an opponent, typically from the West -and "Wisdom" -excerpts from the Quran or hadiths related to key themes -regularly appeared in Dabiq's issues.
Stable core message, shifting themes ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Dabiq's fifteen issues span a tumultuous time in IS's history from the announcement of its so-called caliphate and the zenith of its territorial gains through a period of ultimately devastating resource, personnel and territorial losses. The magazine thus offers a fascinating insight into IS's use of propaganda deployed both proactively and reactively to shape the perceptions and polarise the support of followers as strategic conditions shift.
19 Dabiq's core message and the psychosocial dynamics it sought to drive remained broadly the same: increase perceptions of crisis and tie these to enemies while framing themselves (IS) as champions of true Sunni Muslims and the only hope for solving enemyinduced crises. However, Dabiq's authors strategically emphasised certain themes over others dependent on how it hoped to shape its audiences' interpretation of changing strategic conditions. It is useful to briefly consider how Dabiq's propaganda evolved over this period.
Dabiq's first two issues focused heavily on establishing the strategic, jurisprudential and theological credentials of IS's politico-military agenda. Issue 1 focused on heralding IS's establishment of its Caliphate as a manifestation of divine will, the product of applying the correct manhaj and unequivocal proof that "the world has divided into two camps". Issue 2 featured two large multi-part articles: "It's either Islamic State or the Flood" 20 and "The flood of the Mubahalah"
21
. The former essentially draws comparisons between the plight of IS and that of Noah while the latter articulates the mubahalah (imploring Allah's curse on the deceitful party) between IS and Jabhat Al-Nusrah in early-2014. As Dabiq explains to its readers, within months of the mubahalah being declared IS had reversed its losses, achieved extraordinary territorial and resource gains peaking with the establishment of its caliphate while its rivals floundered. This article epitomises the interweaving of rational-and identity-choice appeals, a signature of IS propaganda.
The next four issues of Dabiq emphasised calls to foreign fighters by leveraging IS's apparent politico-military successes in the field to highlight the multifaceted credibility of its agenda and the obligation of all "true" Muslims to migrate to "their" Caliphate.
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For instance, the cover of issue 3 declares "A call to Hijrah" and its opening article titled "The Islamic State before al-Malhamah the immigrants to the land of Malahim" begins with this quote from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: "So I swear by the One to whom I will return, that there is no real jihad in Iraq except with the presence of the muhajirin [migrants], the sons of the generous ummah, those who have left their tribes, those who bring victory to Allah and His Messenger." 23 This theme is reinforced by the issue's feature article "Hijrah from hypocrisy to sincerity" 24 Importantly, this message was in stark contrast to Al-Qaeda, especially as communicated in Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire, which had tended to discourage foreign fighters instead stressing the importance of lone mujahid attacks. Through issues 4, 5 and 6, IS's military successes and the variety and efficacy of its governance initiatives were a central focus, especially in detailed "Islamic State Reports" sections. The emphasis tended to shift across these issues with issue 4 dominated by content promoting successes in IS's areas of control across Syria and Iraq. In contrast, issues 5 and 6 focused more on IS's growing transnational influence with articles heralding the swearing of bayats (pledges) across the Middle East and North Africa 26 and praising the actions of lone actors in the West.
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Whether strategically or coincidentally, issue 7 appears to be significant pivot point in Dabiq's evolution. Three new sections were introduced with this issue: "From the Pages of History" which identifies lessons drawn from Islam's history pertinent to contemporary challenges, "Among the Believers Are Men" eulogising IS militants, and "To Our Sisters" offering content catering specifically to IS's female audiences. 28 The timing may also be significant with issue 7 being the first issue released in 2015 and in the aftermath of high profile events that captured global media attention (e.g. the burning to death of a Jordanian pilot featured in IS's video "Healing the Believer's chests"). Indeed, an opening article is devoted to justifying that execution ("The burning of the Murtadd pilot") 29 and the video is cross-promoted later in the issue.
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Furthermore, the feature article titled "The Extinction of the Grayzone" 31 contains the central argument of IS's appeals to Western Muslims: with the establishment of the Caliphate there is no excuse for any "true" (i.e. IS-aligned) Muslim to avoid either traveling to IS's areas of control or acting on IS's behalf (i.e. what it would describe as "just terror"). Issue 7 represents the stylistic and structural blueprint for Dabiq's remaining issues.
Some notable trends emerge in Dabiq's later issues. The first relates to ways in which Dabiq sought to draw its readers deeper into its propaganda web with large multi-part articles that appeared across multiple issues as well as cross-promotional advertisements of recent or upcoming propaganda releases. For instance, the five-part article titled "The allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham", 32 which condemned AQ-aligned rebels fighting in Syria, appeared across five issues and, much like the effect of recurring sections across multiple issues, may help to create a sense of coherence and consistency in IS's messaging over time. The purpose of cross-promoting propaganda releases, for instance the emergence in issue 9 of "Selected 10" advertisements promoting videos released by IS's wilayat-based media units, may have the effect of corralling readers towards other IS propaganda and thus coaxing them deeper into IS's "competitive system of meaning". Second, Dabiq's narratives increasingly focused on transnational issues, especially concerning Western Muslims, which is in subtle contrast to its earlier issues. This is evidenced in feature articles emphasising the conspiring of Muslim and Western ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… leaders, 33 warnings about the "new breed of crusader" that seeks to "anger the Muslims by mocking and ridiculing" the Prophet Muhammad, 34 the stories of foreign fighters in recurring "Interview" and "Among the Believers are men" sections 35 and an increasing emphasis on terrorism in the West. 36 It is a transition that reflects both shifting conditions on the ground (e.g. during this period IS's progress in the field stalled then started to recede), Dabiq's primary target audience (e.g. English speaking Muslims globally) and the position of Dabiq within the context of IS's broader propaganda campaign (e.g. understanding its purpose within the context of other propaganda outputs).
Finally, the nature of Dabiq's appeals to its readership shifted considerably from 2014-15 to 2016-17. During the period of its boom (2014) (2015) , Dabiq's messaging tended to emphasise themes such as statehood, conventional politico-military activities, calls to foreign fighters, the notion of building its ranks and rational-choice appeals. However, as its fortunes hurtled towards another bust (2015-16), Dabiq tended to emphasise themes of unconventional politico-military activities, struggle, purification of the ranks, engaging in "just terror", and identity-choice appeals. These dynamics reflect a propaganda hedging strategy which facilitated a thematic transition circa. 2015-16 as its politico-military fortunes declined.
The fifteenth issue of Dabiq epitomised the aforementioned trends. Dabiq 15 contained three "Selected 10" ads and a cross-promotion to Al-Furqan's "The structure of the Khilafah" video, 37 focused heavily on Europe's summer of terror and particularly targeted converts 38 with content dominated by identity-choice appeals. Its central theme was clear: IS are deadlier than ever and its enemies need to consider their dire predicament. Indeed, more than previous issues, the messages in Dabiq 15 was designed for IS's enemies particularly in the "Foreword" 39 and other articles such as "Why we hate you and why we fight you" 40 and "Break the cross". 41 It is telling that while ISN, ISR and early issues of Dabiq were filled with images promoting the range and effectiveness of IS's politico-military achievements accompanied by narratives dominated by rationalchoice appeals (e.g. "join because we are strong"), issue 15 focussed heavily on terrorist attacks in the West by so-called "soldiers of the caliphate" designed to inspire others with identity-choice appeals (e.g. "act because of who you are"). These themes would play a central role in IS's next magazine for English-speaking audiences: Rumiyah. Key theme/s: IS focus on establishing its credibility on multiple levels using "the flood" as a key concept. Its opening article compares IS's rise to the struggles of Noah while the feature examines IS and Nusra's mubahalah.
Dabiq, Issue 3
East. Again, the range of IS's offerings to citizensincluding its own currency -remains a key message. 
Dabiq
Rumiyah (Issues 1-15)
As its so-called caliphate crumbled and after a notable lull in production after the release of Dabiq's fifteenth issue, Rumiyah emerged as IS's new multilingual online magazine, the flagship of a seemingly more streamlined overall propaganda effort. Each issue of Rumiyah opened with a quote by Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir, the legendary IS leader who led the organisation through its post-Zarqawi period of bust: "O muwahhidin, rejoice, for by Allah, we will not rest from our jihad except beneath the olive trees of Rumiyah (Rome)." Over thirteen issues, Rumiyah's content mostly consisted of translated articles and infographics, often drawn from its Al-Naba publication, alongside limited "Exclusive" content designed specifically for, in this case, English-speaking audiences. Original content is potentially more resource and time intensive to produce and likely entails greater security risks during the production process. Translating recycled content into different linguistic versions of Rumiyah may have been a strategic decision to pivot towards a more efficient messaging strategy with the added advantage of deploying a consistent message to its diverse audiences if at the expense of tailored content.
Nevertheless, Rumiyah offered its audiences a diversity of articles and infographics that often appeared in sections adopted from Dabiq such as "Among the Believers are Men", "Selected 10", "Military and Covert Operations" and "Sisters". Multi-part articles published over several issues, like " 43 Al-Zarqawi's "And likewise the Messengers are afflicted, when the final outcome is theirs" was published in several parts spread over issues 8, 9 and 10. Al-Zarqawi's "Important advice for the Mujahidin" was published across issues 11, 12 and 13. 44 Al-Muhajir's "Paths to Victory" was published in four parts across issues 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Rumiyah.
highlight its ability to govern, six of thirteen Rumiyah issues contained interviews with IS government and military officials. 45 Far more common, however, were reports of IS militants inflicting violence against its enemies on behalf of the truest of the true believers promoted in eye-catching Al-Naba infographics and "Military and Covert Operations" sections. It is perhaps unsurprising given IS's politico-military freefall that Rumiyah's messaging was dominated by identity-choice appeals that grew increasingly desperate with each issue. Indeed, by 2017, Rumiyah all but demanded its supporters switch-off their rational-choice reasoning, hardly surprising given IS's crushing losses in the field.
With its second issue, Rumiyah introduced a "Just Terror Tactics" section similar in intent to AQAP's "Open Source Jihad" section. The emergence of "Just Terror Tactics" in many ways represented an opportunity for IS to offer not only the operational, strategic and jurisprudential rationale for engaging in terrorism but a rare opportunity for rationalchoice messaging that framed terrorism in the West as the cost-benefit alternative to becoming a foreign fighter. This messaging was reinforced by instructional messaging in other formats whether via video (e.g. "You must fight them o muwahhid", a multilingual instructional video showing IS supporters how to engage in knife attacks and produce the explosive acetone peroxide) or "unofficially" by IS fanboys online. It seems that IS may have recognised that as its territorial losses continue, remaining relevant means continuing to have practical appeal and instructional content imbues its message with a type of rational-choice appeal that would otherwise be missing given their ongoing losses.
Purify the Ranks, Punish the Kufr
A simple yet powerful overarching theme was common across Rumiyah's thirteen issues: IS's current hardships are gifts from the divine designed to purify our ranks so remain committed and punish the kuffar wherever you find them. With each issue, IS's propagandists presented a diverse array of messages to support not only Rumiyah's overarching theme but the group's central narrative that, now more than ever, IS are the only hope for solving Sunni-crises caused by their enemies. With reference to Table 4 , it is useful to highlight the various ways in which Rumiyah's issues sought to persuade its readers in this way. For example, the "exclusive" content in Rumiyah's inaugural issue was a eulogy for the Australian Ezzit Raad ("Abu Mansur al-Muhajir) published in its "Among the Believers are Men" section. 46 This article showcased the ability of IS's propagandists to produce content that could simultaneously resonate with not only globally disparate English-speaking audiences but demonstrate to specific audiences that IS understood their unique local nuances. The article details the "War on Terror" in Australia, the introduction and application of "new, retrospective anti-terrorism laws" and its apparent impact on Raad and his peers. The article demonstrated a kind of "glocalisation" strategy in that it was written so that IS's transnational supporters could broadly appreciate its message but Australian audiences (especially those from the state of Victoria) would immediately recognise its local nuances. articles such as "Brutality and severity towards the kuffar" 47 , "Glad tidings of imminent victory to the patient" 48 and "The Pledge to fight to the death" 49 or al-Naba infographics like "The excellence of jihad". 50 However, reporting from its transnational provinces was also drawn upon to demonstrate that IS continued to remain and expand. 51 Indeed, Rumiyah's final issue for 2016 opened with a Foreword titled "Hijrah does not cease as long as the kuffar are fought." 52 Also notable is that Issues 2 and 3 featured Rumiyah's first "Just Terror Tactics" articles devoted to knife and vehicle attacks respectively while Issue 4 offered a single page infographic reinforcing the knife attack instructions. "Just Terror Tactics" would appear again in issue 5 (arson attacks) and issue 9 (hostage-taking).
Rumiyah's first issue for 2017 (issue 5) featured two "exclusive" articles titled "Collateral Carnage"
53 -articulating IS's position on the killing of women and children -and a "Just Terror Tactics" outlining the benefits of arson attacks. Indeed, fire was a prominent theme in issue 5 which promoted IS's execution of Turkish troops by incineration with articles such as "The flames of justice". 54 This may have been an attempt by IS to replicate the propaganda strategy it deployed at the beginning of 2015 with the burning death of a Jordanian pilot which featured in a video titled "Healing the Believer's Chests" with cross-promotions and explanatory articles in Dabiq 7. With the opening issues of 2017, IS introduced new content in Rumiyah with a specific "Sisters" section appearing in issue 5, cross-promotional ads for Al-Hayat video releases in issue 6, crosspromotional ads for Al-Himmah library publications in issue 7 and Rumiyah Infographics in issue 8 that went onto appear in subsequent issues.
For the first six issues of 2017 there also seemed to be a greater coherence of content around a particular message that, in its own way, supported Rumiyah's common overarching theme. For example, the common message in issue 6 was for IS's supporters to be wary of deceitful and treacherous Muslims with articles such as "The Rights of Muslims over each other", 55 "And do not weaken in pursuing the enemy" 56 and "Resembling the Kuffar". 57 In the aftermath of executing Turkish soldiers and the Istanbul nightclub attack such messaging clearly served the strategic purpose of justifying attacks against Muslims and underscoring IS's narrow say-do gap. The content in issue 7 focussed heavily on reinforcing IS's methodology (e.g. "Establishing the Islamic State: Between the prophetic methodology and the paths of deviants " 58 ) and the need for true believers to stay the course (e.g. "That Allah should test those who believe and destroy the disbelievers" 59 , "Only those of his slaves with knowledge fear Allah" 60 and "What they never told me" 61 ). The cover of issue 8 featured the image of the late IS propagandist "Abu Sulayman Ash-Shami" (Ahmad Abousamra), the third IS propagandist to be eulogised in Rumiyah after Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani (issue 1) and Abu Muhammad al-Furqan (issue 3). For issue 9 Rumiyah's focus was on enflaming Muslim-……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… Christian tensions (e.g. "The ruling on belligerent Christians" 62 ) while issue 10 used the achievements of IS militants in Marawi to underscore the jurisprudential legitimacy and strategic efficacy of its manhaj (e.g. "Interview with the Amir of the Soldiers of the Khilafah in East Asia" 63 ).
With the final three issues of Rumiyah in 2017 there were growing signs that the war was once again taking its toll on the quality of IS's propaganda production. Rumiyah's eleventh issue underscored IS's desperation for supporters to act not just despite but because of the extraordinary odds facing the group (e.g. "Either we exterminate the Mushrikin or die trying" 64 ). IS offered a range of angles on this message with articles from Al-Zarqawi for an historical perspective ("Important advice for the Mujahidin" 65 ), a speech from IS's media spokesman ("And when the believers saw the confederates" 66 ), a female perspective ("Our journey to Allah" 67 ) and the personal stories of a martyr ("Among the Believers are Men: Abu Mujahid Al-Faransi" 68 ). But with issue 12, basic formatting problems and stylistic inconsistencies suggested that the Rumiyah production team were struggling. In terms of content, Rumiyah 12's reflections on the battle of Mosul ("A mujahid's memories from the battle of Mosul" 69 ) and a rallying cry to support the then ongoing battle for Raqqa ("It will be a fire that burns the cross and its people in Raqqa" 70 ) synchronised with key themes in Al-Hayat's Inside the Khilafah video series. Rumiyah's thirteenth issue contained the full spectrum of cross-promotional contentsuch as advertisements for Al Hayat videos, Al-Himmah publications and even an advertisement promoting IS's "Learn the Quran" 71 app for kids -as well as "News" and "Sisters" sections and Part 1 of Al-Zarqawi's "Important advice for the Mujahidin" "Stand and die upon that for which your brothers died" (pp.2-3) "Interview with the Amir of the Central Office for Investigating Grievances" (pp.10-12) "Among the believers are men: Abu Mansur al-Muhajir" (pp.14-17) "The wicked scholars are cursed" (pp.28-30) "The kafir's blood is halal for you, so shed it" (pp.34-36) Key theme/s: Featuring a mix of content from Al-Naba and original material, the death of IS's spokesman and calls to engage in terrorism in the West dominate. Hardship purifies the ranks so only the true and pure remain is a prominent theme as field pressures mount. attack IS's enemies. More than preceding issues, the messaging in Dabiq's final issue appears to be designed for IS's enemies. Key theme/s: Issue 2 clearly distinguishes between "exclusive" content and content translated from Al-Naba. "Just Terror Tactics" is a new section that provides operational advice for engaging in terrorism. The Operations section is significantly scaled down compared to Dabiq. This issue also contains an advertisement for IS's "alphabet teacher" app. 
Rumiyah (issue
Rumiyah (issue 11)
Issue date: Shawwal 1438 (July 2017) Pages: 60 Exclusive articles: "And when the believers saw the confederates" (pp.16-21) Other articles: "Either we exterminate the mushrikin or die trying" (pp.4-5) "Important advice for the mujahidin: Part 1" (pp.6-10) "Our journey to Allah" (pp.12-15) "The ruling on ghanimah, fay, and ihtitab" (pp.28-39) "Know your worth, O enemy of the nations" (pp. [54] [55] [56] [57] Key theme/s: The opening pages of this issue calls for true believers to achieve glory by either killing ISIS's enemies or being killed themselves in this pursuit. These physical battles are framed as manifestations of a multidimensional war between ISIS-aligned Muslims and its enemies that is at once cosmic, psychological, physical, gendered, historical and contemporary. 
Conclusion: Lessons for CT-CVE strategic communication practictioners "All things considered, it is no exaggeration to say that the media operative is a martyrdom-seeker without a belt! This decoration is well-deserved." Excerpt from Media operative, you are also a mujahid, Al-Himma Library
The collection of primary sources presented in this paper spans four magazines, thirtyfive issues and almost three and a half years of seismic strategic shifts across multiple regions. Rather than delving into an in-depth content analysis of each issue, this study simply sought to provide the fields of research and practice with a quick reference guide to IS's English-language magazine. These primary sources offers valuable lessons for both understanding IS propaganda and developing CT-CVE strategic communication campaign and message design approaches. 73 This paper concludes by drawing out four key trends from the preceding section and its implications for CT-CVE practitioners. 74 It is important that practitioners do not fixate on the more rudimentary mechanistic aims of violent extremist propaganda, e.g. recruitment of supporters and inspiring fear in enemies. Violent extremist propagandists appreciate that achieving these rudimentary aims is the likely by-product of satisfying the raison d'être of propaganda messaging: to provide audiences with a "lens" (i.e. a "competitive system of meaning") through which to understand themselves and the world more broadly. Figure 2 offers a useful way to think about not only the strategic logic of IS's messaging but the "competitive system of meaning" it offers target audiences. By coaxing audiences into seeing the world through IS's strategically constructed lens, it is easier to recruit and radicalize supporters as well as lure enemies into the psychological and politico-military traps which are so essential to those fighting asymmetric wars against superior opponents. The extent to which these dynamics are intuitive or strategic is perhaps debatable but two points are important to keep in mind. First, analysis of IS's propaganda doctrine (Media operative you are also a mujahid) indicates that strategy plays a significant role as a driver of IS propaganda efforts.
75 Second, whether intuition or strategy, it does not alter the psychosocial and strategic forces at play. Figure 2 represents the most basic mechanics of the strategic logic that drives IS's propaganda machine. As this study has briefly highlighted, IS deploy an extraordinary range of propaganda strategies and levers that contribute to these dynamics. Practitioners need to be able to identify and understand the range of strategies IS deploys as part of its propaganda effort. For example, in the pages of ISN, ISR, Dabiq and Rumiyah IS have:
• used history as a tool to frame their messaging particularly as a means to legitimise certain political and military actions over others [Framing] • cross-promoted propaganda produced by its central and wilayat based media units as a means to show the interconnectedness of its message, lure potential supporters deeper into its system of meaning and potentially create a culture of conformity (e.g. trademark structure, flow and stylistics) and innovation (a necessity if the products of provincial units are to be selected by central) within its propaganda apparatus [Cross-promotion] .
CT-CVE strategic communications should seek to dismantle IS's "competitive system of meaning" with messaging that targets the rational-and identity-choice "linkages" that IS uses to (a.) bind itself to solutions and its enemies to crises and (b.) force multiply the effects of its actions and nullify those of opponents.
An understanding of the strategic logic that drives IS propaganda is designed to help practitioners satisfy the first rule of CT-CVE strategic communications: "don't do violent extremists any favors". At a very practical level this means avoiding the dissemination of messages that contribute to the aims of IS propaganda. This may seem obvious yet practitioners frequently (if inadvertently) break this first rule. Ideally, CT-CVE messaging should be tailored to dismantle the linkages, represented by the arrows in Figure 2 , that drive the strategic logic of its propaganda effort and bind together IS's "competitive system of meaning". The "linkage-based" approach to CT-CVE strategic communications recommends deploying a combination of rational-and identity-choice messaging both defensively (i.e. to counter violent extremist propaganda) and offensively (i.e. to initiate discourse and/or trigger a counter from adversaries) with a preference for the latter.
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This could involve messages that seek to:
• link government or civil society initiatives to solutions for crises pertinent to target audiences; • link violent extremist actions to crises in target audiences;
• highlight the disparity between violent extremist claims in their propaganda and their actual actions in the field; • highlight how government or civil society initiatives match the promises/claims in its messaging;
These fundamental mechanics need to be augmented by a range of strategies and levers.
The rationale for such an approach is simple: certain messaging strategies and themes may appeal to some members of a target audience more than others thus a range and diversity of strategies is more likely to cater to a motivationally diverse spectrum of target audiences. Moreover, the deployment of multiple strategies and levers may help to create a compounding effect upon target audiences which is potentially lost with the deployment of only a single strategy. Cross-promotion may also be a useful means to maximise the effect of each message and the campaign more broadly. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… IS's English language magazines -as well as its propaganda campaign more broadlyappears to deploy a thematic "hedging" strategy that reflects not only the strategic calculations of its propagandists but facilitates strategic pivots -in both messaging and action -as conditions in the field change. As graphically represented in Figure 3 , IS's propaganda tends to emphasise themes of statehood (epitomised by the Caliphate), conventional politico-military activities, "build the ranks", calls for foreign fighters and rational-choice appeals during periods of boom (e.g. circa 2014-15). During periods of bust (e.g. circa 2016-17), IS's propaganda tends to emphasise themes of struggle and sacrifice, unconventional politico-military activities, "purify the ranks", calls for "just terror" and identity-choice appeals (see Figure 3) . In many ways ISN and ISR are case studies in IS's coming boom while Dabiq is a case study in IS propaganda from boom to coming bust. Rumiyah, on the other hand, emerges as a case study of IS propaganda during a period of bust. However, as highlighted in the preceding section, bust themes did not entirely disappear during periods of boom nor did boom themes disappear entirely during periods of bust. Thematic hedging allows IS's propagandists to strategically pivot its messaging as conditions in the field change and its politico-military activities and those of its adversaries shift.
Figure 3: Hedging
In recognising the characteristics of IS's 'hedging' strategy, CT-CVE strategic communications practitioners are better positioned to shape their campaign and message design to pre-empt IS's strategic pivots in action and messaging.
At a campaign design level, cohering a messaging strategy around a central narrative helps to buffer CT-CVE efforts against IS's hedging strategy. Understanding the signatures of IS's propaganda hedging has important implications for practitioners. First, IS's use of "hedging" underscores the importance of CT-CVE practitioners devising a simple overarching narrative (i.e. a narrative-based approach) to cohere their messaging campaign rather than a narrow selection of themes (i.e. a thematically-based approach). Consider, for instance, the argument that was popular in 2015-16 that anti-IS 3. The strategic role of IS's English-language magazines must be understood within the context of trends across its overall propaganda campaign.
It is essential that the role of IS's English-language magazines are understood within the context of the group's overall propaganda effort. The four magazines examined here represent a specific format (i.e. magazines), disseminated on a specific medium (i.e. online), targeting a certain audience (i.e. English-speaking Muslims, predominantly living in the West) with long form messages (i.e. each issue is several dozen pages in length) disseminated periodically (e.g. monthly, quarterly). After all, IS deploys a multitude of formats (e.g. radio, video, audio) using online (e.g. social media) and offline (e.g. posters) mediums with a mix of short (e.g. 1-2 minutes audiovisual, photo reports) and long (e.g. over 3 minute audiovisual, multipage articles) form messages. Importantly, IS's propaganda campaign has typically been quantitatively dominated by short form messages designed to provide its target audiences with a steady flow (if not a flood) of, for example, photo reports as well as brief statements and audiovisual communiques that are disseminated by its online and offline networks. This may have the effect of priming target audiences for IS's longer form messages, whether online magazines or lengthier audiovisuals. This priming effect may be further reinforced by the tendency for IS's longer form messages to build on themes and narratives that feature in its shorter form messages. CT-CVE strategic communication campaigns need to be calibrated to confront this campaign rollout method.
The KISMI principle (Keep It Simple, Maximise Impact) for rolling-out a CT-CVE strategic communication campaign is characterized by messaging cycles dominated by PS-PS (Persuasive-Simple, Positive-Short) messages punctuated with TANDEM (Thematically Accumulated, Narrative Driven, Emotion Motivators) messaging.
The Keep It Simple Maximise Impact (KISMI) principle of rolling out a CT-CVE strategic communication campaign emerged from three crucial findings to emerge from the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) Project. First, content analyses of violent extremist propaganda suggests that its messaging may seek, whether intuitively or strategically, to drive automatic over deliberative thinking in its audiences by manipulating mental models and social factors which cumulatively may increase their susceptibilities to cognitive biases. Second, human cognitive abilities tend to be reduced under stressful conditions, e.g. stress acts as a buffer for activating deliberative thinking. This is important for CT-CVE messaging because those most susceptible to radicalization are, by definition, individuals and groups experiencing perceptions of crisis (i.e. under stress). Third, whether intuitively or strategically, violent extremist propaganda tends to leverage these psychosocial forces with messaging designed to increase perceptions of crisis. It is for these reasons that the KISMI principle argues that the majority of the messaging deployed by a CT-CVE strategic communications effort should be:
• Persuasive: the message is deployed with the intent of leveraging rational or identity choice decision-making in its audiences. In other words, messaging is deployed with persuasive intent and never for simply informational purposes.
• Simple: the message is direct and unambiguous and does not rely on its audiences engaging in complex deliberative considerations in order to achieve its intent.
• Positive: the message focuses on the benefits of certain rational or identity choice decisions. In contrast, negative messaging focuses on the detrimental impact of certain rational or identity choice decisions.
• Short: whether written, verbal or audiovisual, the message is brief in length.
As illustrated in Figure 4 , PS-PS messaging should dominate at both the message cycle (i.e. a designated period of message dissemination linked to a particular event or issue) and overall campaign levels. However, PS-PS messaging should be punctuated by the strategic dissemination of long-form TANDEM messages that are:
• Thematically Accumulated: the message brings together the key themes which featured in the PS-PS messaging that preceded it in the messaging cycle. Put another way, the PS-PS messaging acts as a primer for the fusion of themes that appear in the TANDEM message.
• Narrative Driven: the message ties together those aforementioned themes into a story. This narrative may use certain characters, issues or events to explore the relationship between those themes. • Emotion Motivators: the message weaves emotion-based motivators pertinent to the target audience into its narrative.
As graphically represented in Figure 4 , the purpose of deploying TANDEM messaging is to leverage the dynamics of target audience priming created by the preceding period of PS-PS messaging. The themes, persuasive intent and secondary aims of the TANDEM messaging are reinforced by more PS-PS messaging that culminates again in TANDEM messaging to end the message cycle. With careful campaign level planning, message cycles can be synchronized to create a cumulative compounding impact on target audiences over the course of a campaign. CT-CVE practitioners should interpret the emergence of Rumiyah's "Just Terror Tactics" section as a product of several interconnected dynamics. First, "Just Terror Tactics" offered a rare opportunity for IS's propagandists to disseminate rational-choice messaging to English-speaking audiences. Second, instructional material promises to generate an almost guaranteed "force multiplying" impact on IS's propaganda aims. This occurs primarily because the media have tended to report on the latest "Just Terror Tactics" section as somehow indicative of an ever-present terrorist threat thus inadvertently amplifying the reach of such messaging. Third, the dissemination of instructional material acts as a form of "preparatory offensive messaging" whereby it essentially primes the information theatre for a certain event, in this case a so-called "inspired" terrorist attack, the group will then respond to with waves of secondary messaging. This approach sets up a propaganda "trap" whereby IS can lay claim to the violent actions of an individual with whom they have had potentially no prior contact and thus no prior knowledge. It is a claim which government messaging and media reporting have too often inadvertently verified and amplified rather than countered. Fourth, terrorist attacks in the West, including so-called "inspired" attacks", are the asymmetric warfare equivalent of "strategic bombing" designed to undermine the morale of target populations and coax democracies into misguided responses that can then be exploited. Recognising these factors must inform post-incident messaging plans.
CT-CVE post-incident messaging should seek to undermine the strategic logic and impact of inspired attacks.
Two simple lessons provide a useful foundation for informing post-incident CT-CVE messaging frameworks. First, government and civil society communications in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist plot or incident should be guided by the first rule of CT-CVE messaging: "don't do violent extremists any favors". Speculative commentary that attributes responsibility for an attack to a certain violent extremist group or repeats violent extremist claims of responsibility helps groups like IS to achieve their multifaceted aims. While the political and media capital may prove too great for some to resist, overtime closer adherence to this simple recommendation may help to generate a culture of "self-policing" amongst politicians, journalists and media commentators. Second, CT-CVE strategic communications should actively dispute violent extremist claims of responsibility for "inspired" attacks, i.e. where there is no direct link between the perpetrators and the group. Allowing violent extremists, like IS, to make such claims affords them all the "upsides" of a terrorist attack without the risks associated with direct operational planning and engagement. Far better to remove the incentives for IS to claim "inspired" attacks thereby potentially helping to drive a strategic pivot towards directed attacks.
Final Remarks
This paper offered the fields of research and practice with a quick reference guide for IS's English-language magazines circa 2014-2017. It concluded by drawing out four trends and their implications for CT-CVE strategic communication practitioners pertinent to confronting IS messaging and potentially violent extremist propaganda more broadly. Future publications will expand upon the primary source materials and findings in this study.
